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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE. 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This case centers around storage water conveyance loss, or "shrink," and whether a 
calculation o f  storage water conveyance loss under an administrative rule, which is necessary for a 
state-employed watermaster to deliver the accurate amounts o f  natural flow water to water users, is 
binding on an irrigation district (who owns the storage water) as to how such conveyance loss is 
charged or assessed amongst members of  its irrigation district. 
This case was initially plead by Pehrson and Nelson et al. (hereinafter, "Appellants") only 
as an action to interpret an administrative rule specific to the Big Lost River Basin setting forth how 
to calculate conveyance loss. The specific rule at issue-IDAPA 37.02.12.040.03.b (hereinafter, 
"Rule 40.03 .b")-is part of a set of  administrative rules which are specific to the distribution of  water 
by the state-enlployed watermaster in Basin 34.' This rule, in its entirety, provides the following: 
Conveyance losses in the natural charnel shall be proportioned by the watermaster 
between natural flow and impounded water. The proportioning shall be done on a 
river reach basis. Impounded water flowing through a river reach that does not have 
a conveyance loss will not be assessed aloss for that reach. Impounded water flowiug 
through any river reach that does have a conveyance loss will be assessed the 
proportionate share of  the loss for each losillg reach through which the impounded 
water flows. To avoid an iterative accounting procedure, impoulided water 
conveyance loss from the previous day  shall be assessed on the current day. 
The term "impounded water" is not specifically defined, but includes both storage water and 
a separate unique type of natural flow water, called "rotation credit."' In order for the watermaster 
! IDWK Administrative Basin 34 is tlie Big Lost Xivei Basin. 111 this brief, both terms are used 
interchangeably. 
2 See IDAPA 37.03.12.010.012 and 015. The distinctioli between storage water and rotation credit is set 
forth in further detail below in Section IV.A.2. 
to deliver natural flow water, it is necessary for him to calculate the conveyance loss in the Big Lost 
River for all types of water, including impounded water (storage water and rotation credit). The 
central issue to this case is: What binding effect does the calculation of conveyance loss 
contemplated in Rule 40.03.b, which is performed by the state-employed watermaster, have on the 
Big Lost River Irrigation Districts's (hereinafter, "BLRID") storage water in how BLRID assesses 
amongst its patrons tile conveyance losses suffered in the Big Lost River? 
Appellants interpret the above rule such that it is binding on BLRID in how it must charge 
conveyallce loss amongst its patrons, and that it must he done by river reach. The other parties to 
this case, including the Idaho Department of Water Resources (hereinafter, "IDWR" or 
"Department") interpret the rule such that it is not binding on BLND in how it must charge 
conveyance loss amongst its patrons, but is only a calculation that necessarily must be performed in 
order for the watermaster to deliver accurately natural flow water. The district court agreed with the 
other parties, and not Appellants, and held that Rule 40.03.b is unambiguous in its application, and 
does not bind BLRID. It appears that the issue now before this Court is whether the district court 
correctly interpreted Rule 40.03.b.' 
However, after the issues relating to interpretation of the administrative rule were decided, 
Waddoups and Pearson et aL4 (hereinafter, "Intervenors") entered into settlement negotiations to 
3 As set forth below in Section 11, the Issues on Appeal, it does not appear that Appellants have correctly 
stated what the district court decided, and therefore, what this Court is to decide on appeal. 
4 The Intervenors are made up of Robert Waddoups and a group of approximately 187 similarly situated 
residents of Butte County, Idaho, whose lands are located within the Big Lost River Irrigation District downstream 
from the Blaine Diversion and are entitled to the use of storage water from BLRID, and Jay F. Pearson and a group 
of approximately 259 similarly situated residents of Butte County, Idaho, whose lands are located within or near 
BLRID downstream from the Blaine Diversion and while not entitled directly lo the use of storage water froin 
BLRID, are nevertheless very dependent on the augmentation and recharge benefits of the delivery and use of 
BLRID's storage water. 
resolve a cross-claim Intervenors had against the Big Lost River Irrigation District (hereinafter, 
"BLRID").' After the cross-claim was resolved, the Appellailts obtained new counsel, and when the 
order and judgment resolving the cross-claim was entered by the district cou~t, Plaintiffs new 
counsel filed a motion for reconsideration which raised new issues that were neither plead in 
Appellants' original complaint, nor arguedpreviously, which related to Appellants interpretation of 
a 1936 decree which Appellants alleged addressed conveyance loss. 
In essence, Appellants requested the district court to reconsider issues that were never 
considered. The district court denied the motion for reconsideration, and now Appellants are 
requesting this court to address these same issues that were raised for the first time on a motion for 
reconsideration. As set forth below, issues surrounding interpretation of the 1936 decree were not 
properly plead, and therefore should not be considered on appeal to this Court. To the extent the 
1936 decree is considered, it simply does not address the conveyance loss issues. 
B. Course of Proceedings be lo^.^ 
This case was initiated by Appellants with the filing of a "Complaint and Request for 
Immediate InjunctiveRelief and a Motion for Preliminary Injunction and to Shorten Time for Notice 
of Hearing", all of which were filed on July 28, 2005. The Appellants sought an injunction to 
prevent the BLPJD from applying a "universal shrink" rule to [storage water deliveries to] 
5 The cross-claim was that the only equitable way to charge conveyance loss amongst B L N D  patrons was 
by universal shrink. The parties entered into a stipulation that BLRlD would only apply a universal shrink rule for 
charging its patrons for their share of conveyance loss for losses in the Big Lost River. 
G In this brief, the record will be cited as "R Vol. I" a i~d  "Tr Vol. I" for the record prepared for Supreme 
Court No. 34203 which was filed on October 17, 2007, but the appeal was withdrawn due to a pending cross-claim. 
For Supreme Court No. 35543, which was filed on September 24,2008, the record will be cited as "R Vol. 11" and 
"Tr Voi. 11" for the record prepared for the Supreme Court. 
Appellants and other water users similarly situated'by enforcinganad~ninistrativerulepromulgated 
by the Idaho Department of Water Resources-Rule 40.03.b. After a "Motion for Disqualification 
of Judge" was granted, a hearing on Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction was heard on 
August 10,2005. 
Defendant BLRID filed its "Answer to Plaintiff's Complaint" on August 9,2005, along with 
a "Motion to Dismiss Complaint." The following day, August 10, 2005, Defendants filed a 
"Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Preliminary Injunction." The district court also heard 
oral argument on the Motion for Preliminary Injunction on August 10,2005. On August 11, 2005, 
the district court issued an "Opinion and Decisionon Appellants' Motion for Preliminaty Injunction" 
wherein the district court granted the Motion for Preliminary Injunction, preventing the Defendant 
from "applying the universal shrink rule."' 
In response to the Defendant's earlier Motion to Dismiss, Appellants filed an amended 
complaint on August 12, 2005.9 In the "Second Amended Complaint and Request for Immediate 
Injunctive Relief," the Appellants' prayer for relief, in its entirety, prayed as follows: 
1. That the Court hold an immediate emergency hearing to consider whether or 
not an injunction should be placed preventing the Defendants from applying 
a universal shrink rule to Appellants and other water users similarly situated. 
2. After issuance of apreliminary injunction, the Court schedule this matter for 
trial so that the issue of shrinkage call be once and for all formally 
adjudicated. 
7 R Vol. I, p. 5. 
8 R Vol. I, p. 28-34. 
9 R Vol. I, p. 35-42. 
3. For aDeclaratory Judgment, ruling that IDWR's Water Distribution Rules for 
Water District No. 34, Rule 40.03.b, applies to Defendants and allocation of 
shrinkage must be done by reach as set forth therein. 
4. For the issuance of a peremptory writ of mandate or prohibition, in the 
Court's discretion, requiring Defendants to comply with the applicable law 
and allocate shrinkage by reach. 
5. For attorney fees and costs of Court incurred by Appellants in bringing this 
action. 
6. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and appr~priate. '~ 
On November 17,2005, a "Stipulation for Filing of Counterclaim" was filed wherein both 
parties stipulated to the filing of the "Defendant's Counterclaim for Declaratory Judgment". The 
district court's "Order Authorizing Filing of Counterclaim" was issued onNovember 30,2005. On 
December 14,2005, an"0rder Setting Pretrial Conference and Jury Trial" was issued setting the jury 
trial in the above-captioned matter for April 24, 2006. 
On January 27, 2006, BLRID filed a "Motion for Order of   is missal and Motion for 
Summary Judgment." On February 1,2006, agroup ofwater users made up the Intervenors and the 
Rutte County Board of County Commissioners filed a "Motion to Intervene" pursuant to Rule 24 of 
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. On February 13,2006, the Appellants filed a cross-motion for 
summary judgment. The hearing for the two summary judgment motions and the motion to 
intervene was held on February 27, 2006. As to the Motion to Intervene, the district court denied 
intervention due to the proximity of trial and late request for intervention. However, the district 
court allowed the Intervenors limited participation as amicus curiae. As to the motions for summary 
judgment, the district court took the matter under advisement. 
On April 6,2006, the district court issued an "Opinion, Decision, and Order on Defendants' 
Motion for Order of Dismissal." Citing to Idaho Code 5 67-5278(2), the district court determined 
that the parties' claims for declaratory relief could not be considered because Idaho Code 3 67- 
5278(2) requires the agency which promulgated the administrative rule at issue-in this case 
IDWR-to be a party to the action. The district court concluded that "IDWR is a party that must be 
joined to this action."" The district court instructed the parties that it would consider the lnotious 
for summary judgment after IDWR was joined and had an opportunity to respond to the motions. 
Shortly after the district court's April 6,2006 decision, Intervenors filed a "Second Motion 
to Intervene," which the district court granted on May 12,2006 as to the above-named Intervenors, 
but not as to the Butte County Board of County Commissioners. 
After the requisite amended pleadings, responses, and other documents necessary to join 
IDWR. as a party were filed, the district court heard oral argument on BLRID's motion for sumrnary 
judgment and Appellants' cross-motion for summary judgment on October 30,2006. The district 
court issued its "Opinion, Decision, and Order on Defendant Big Lost River Irrigation District's 
Motion for Summary Judgment and Appellants' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment" on 
November 17, 2006 granting BLRID's motion for summary judgment. The district court held the 
following: 
The Court declines to accept Appellants' application of Rule 40.03.b. The 
Court cannot read requirements into an unambiguous administrative rule. Further, 
the Court cannot apply an administrative rule contrary to the Idaho Code. For these 
reasons, the Appellants' application of Rule 40.03.b is not supported by Idaho law. 
The Court declares that Rule 40.03.b applies to the distribution of water by 
the IDWR to appropriators within Water District 34. The Court also declares that the 
BLRID Board is not mandated to distribute storage water within the BLRID 
according to watermaster's calculatio~l in Rule 40.03.b." 
On December 1, 2006, Appellants filed a "Motion for Reconsideration," and ihe oral 
argument on the motion was heard on February 5, 2007. The district court thereafter issued its 
"Opinion, Decision, and Order on Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration," wherein ihe district 
court, in denying the motion for reconsideration, determined the following: 
In their Brief in Support of Motion for Reconsideration, Appellants fail to 
present new infonnation creating an issue for trial; therefore, there is no basis upon 
which to reconsider the Court's November order granting summary judgment to 
BLRID.. 
Each of Plaintiffs arguments dispute the Court's interpretation of the law as 
it applies to the facts, but in none of those arguments is there a presentation of new 
facts that would alter the legal outcome of the analysis. Absent the presentationof 
new facts, reconsideration requires something beyond a reiteration of previous 
argument, now custom-tailored to address the Court's opinion. Nothing has been 
submitted in support of the present motion that persuades the Court that the grant of 
summary judgment was incorrect." 
After the district court's decisionon the motion for reconsideration, Appellants filed aNotice 
of Appeal on May 3, 2007.14 However, the district court case was not fii~ally resolved, as the 
12 R Vol. I, p. 156-57. 
13 RVol . I ,p .  181. 
14 R Vol. 1, p.186-89. 
Intervenors had a pending cross-claim against BLRID, which alleged that the only equitable way of 
assessi~ig conveyance loss was pursuant to a universal shrink rule. 
With the summary judgment decision in tact, the Intervenors and BLRID eventually agreed 
to a stipulation to resolve Intervenors' cross-claim against BLRID. The stipulation was filed in 
Jaiiuary of2008, and an "Order, Judgment, and Decree" was entered by the district court on February 
20,2008. 
On March 3, 2008, the Appellants, now with new coun~e l , '~  filed a document entitled 
"Motions & Objections by AppellantsiCou~iterdefendants." I-Iowever, the filing essentially served 
as a motion for reconsideration of the district couit's order with regards to the resolution ofthe cross- 
claim of which the Appellants were not a party, and further, sought reconsideratiorl of the district 
court's earlier orders of March 23, 2007 (the order denying motion for reconsideration) and the 
original summary judgment order of November 17, 2006 which related to interpretation of Rule 
40.03.b. A hearing on the second motion for reconsideration was held on June 9,2008, and after 
hearing argument on the issues, the district court denied the second motion for re~onsideration,'~ and 
issued an order to that effect on June 12,2008. 
Appellants then filed a Notice of Appeal on July 24, 2008, which set forth five bases for 
appeal. Appellants thereafter filed their Appellant's Brief on .January 7,2009, which only set forth 
two bases on appeal." Even as to the two bases for appeal, however, Intervenors disagree with how 
the Appellants have presented the issues on appeal in this matter, because they simply do not reflect 
15 Patrick D. Brown of Hutchinson & Brown, L1,P. 
16 Tr Vol. 11, p. 377-80. 
17 Appellant's Brief at 15. 
the nature of what the district court decided. The actual decision the district court made in this 
matter related to an issue of law-the interpretation of an administrative rule. This is evident because 
IDWR was required by law to be joined as aparty to the case. The district court's decision is found 
at R Vol. I, p.145-57, and the district coui-t's decision is perhaps best summarized by the final 
paragraph of the district courts's analysis: 
The Court declares that Rule 40.03.b applies to the distribution of water by the 
IDWR to appropriators within Water District 34. The Court also declares that the 
BLFUD Board is not mandated to distribute storage water within BLRID according 
to watermaster's calculation in Rule 40.03.b." 
The two issues on appeal presented by Appellants are written such that they ignore the issue 
of administrative rule interpretation, and it is therefore impossible to respond correspondingly to 
Appellants statement of the issues onappeal. As aresult, Intervenors will set forth what they believe 
are additional issues on appeal pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 35(b)(4) 
11. ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL. 
I .  Did the district court properly interpret Rule 40.03.b such that the calculation of 
conveyance loss contemplated in Rule 40.03.b, which is performed by the state- 
employed waterinaster to deliver natural flow water, is not binding on BLRID, the 
owner of storage water rights, in how BLRID assesses amongst its patrons the 
conveyance losses to its storage water suffered in the Big Lost River? 
2. Did Appellants have standing to challenge the district court's order involving across- 
claim Appellants were not a party to? 
3. Did the Appellants properly plead issues relating to the 1936 decree in this matter? 
4. In the alternative, if the 1936 decree was properly raised, does it decree how BLRID 
is to charge conveyance loss to its patrons? 
5. Are the Intervenors entitled to attorney's fees on appeal in this matter? 
111. ARGUMENT. 
A. The district court did properly interpret Rule 40.03.b such that the calculation of 
conveyance Boss contempfated in Rule 40.03.b, which is performed by the state- 
employed watermaster to deliver natural flow water, is not binding on BLRBD, a the 
owner of storage water rights, in how BLND charges amongst its patrons the 
conveyance losses to its storage water suffered in the Big Lost River. 
1. Standard of Review. 
The decision made by the district court was an entry of summary judgment wherein the court 
interpreted Rule 40.03.b.'~ In this context on appeal, "[sltatutory interpretation is a question of  law 
over which this Court exercises free review. Administrative regulations are subject to the same 
principles of statutory construction as statutes."20 
This court has established specific steps to guide a statutory interpretation analysis. These 
steps also apply to rules and regulations contained in IDAPA because "IDAPA rules and regulations 
are traditionally afforded the same effect of law as  statute^,"^' and "principles of statutory 
construction apply equally to administrative regula t i~ns ."~~ A court engages in statutory construction 
because "[ilt is fundamental that the judiciary has the ultimate responsibility to construe legislative 
language to determine the law. This principle extends to our review of administrative rules . . 
19 The Appellants and BLRID filed cross-motions for suinlnary judgment, and Appellants agreed that there 
were no issues of fact as they believed the rule was unambiguous. See Tr Vol. I, p. 243, LL. 4-6. 
20 Sanchez v. State, Dept. of Correction, 143 Idaho 239,242, 141 P.3d 1108, 11 11 (2006) (internal 
citations omitted). 
21 Huyett v. Idaho StaleUniv., 140 Idaho 904, 909, 104 P.3d 946, 951 (2004) (citing to Roeder Holdings, 
L.L.C. v. Bd. of Equalization ofAda County, 136 Idaho 809, 813,41 P.3d 237,241 (2001)). 
22 Parker v. Underwriters Laboratories, Inc., 140 Idaho 517, 520, 96 P.3d 618, 621 (2004). 
23 Mason v. Donnelly Club, 135 Idaho 581, 583, 21P.3d 903, 905 (2001) (citations omitted). 
Furthermore, "[tlhe object in interpreting a statute is to 'derive the intent of the legislative body that 
adopted the act."'24 
As set forth by various ldaho cases, there are two steps that must be followed when courts 
are faced with statutory construction issues: 
-1: Determine whether or not tile rule is ambiguous: "If the statutory language 
is u~ambiguous, 'the clearly expressed intent of the legislative body must be given 
effect, and there is no occasion for a court to consider rules of statutory 
constructi~n."'~~ A statute is ambiguous "when the meaning is so doubtful or obscure 
that 'reasonable minds might be uncertain or disagree as to its meaning.' 'However, 
ambiguity is not established merely because different possible interpretations are 
presented to a court. . . . A statute is not ambiguous merely because an astute mind 
can devise more than one interpretation of itnz6 In determining whether a word or 
phrase is ambiguous, "[wlords and phrases of a statute are to be construed according 
to their context."27 
-2: If a court determines that a statute or rule is ambiguous, then "the Court 
employs relevant rules of statutory construction, beginning with the literal words of 
the statute, giving the language of the statute its plain, obvious, and rational 
meanings."28 The court "has the duty to ascertain the legislative intent of the 
legislature, not only must the literal words of the statute be examined, but also the 
context of the words, the public policy behind the statute, and its legislative 
history."29 In the context'of an administrative rule, the court must also determine 
what level of deference must be given to the agency's interpretation of the rule. As 
stated by the Idaho Supreme Court: 
This Court bas established a four-prong test for determining the appropriate 
level of deference to be given to an agency construction of a statute. 
First, we must determine if the agency has been entrusted with the 
responsibility to administer the statute at issue. 
24 Canty v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 138 Idaho 178, 182, 59 P.3d 983,987 (2002). 
25 Id. 
26 Id (citations omitted) (quoting State v. Browning, 123 ldaho 748, 750, 852 P.2d 500, 502 (Ct. App 
1993)). 
27 Huyett v, Idaho State Univ., 140 Idaho 904, 909, 104 P.3d 946, 951 (2004). 
28 Parker v. Underwriters Laboratories, Inc., 140 Idaho 517, 520,96 1'.3d 618,621 (2004). 
29 State v. Ambro, 142 Idaho 77, 80, 123 P.3d 710,713 (2005). 
Second, the agency's statutory construction must be reasonable. 
Third, we must determine whether the statutory language at issue 
does not expressly treat the precise question at issue. 
Finally, we must ask whether ally ofthe rationales underlying the rule 
of deference are met. 
If tile four-prong test is met, then courts must give "considerable weiglrt" to 
the agency's interpretation of the statute." 
2. Crucial Factual Background Regarding Water "Types" in Basin 34.'' 
i. Introduction. 
Before discussing Rule 40.03.b, it is crucial to provide background as to the "types" of water 
recognized in Basin 34. The administration of Idaho's water resources and the understanding of 
Idaho's water law is complicated. The current controversy before this Court is no exception, as it 
involves the interpretation of Rule 40.03.b. The following paragraphs discuss the different "types" 
of water administered in the Big Lost River Basin because this background is absolutely crucial to 
the interpretation of Rule 40.03.b. 
Under Idaho law, there are generally two "types" of surlace water: (1) natural flow water, 
and (2) storage water. However, in the Big Lost River Basin, natural flow water can be broken down 
further into two sub-classes: (a) traditional natural flow, and (b) impounded natural flow, or "rotation 
credit" water. This second sub-class of natural flow water- "rotation credits-is absolutely unique 
to the Big Lost River Basin, and is only recognized in Basin 34. It is not recognized in any other part 
of Idaho 
30 Mason v. Domeily Club, 135 Idaho 581, 583,21P.3d 903, 905 (2001) (citations omitted); See also, 
J.R. Simplot Co. v. Tax Comm'n, 120 Idaho 849, 820 P.2d 1206 (1991). 
3 1 The Big Lost River Basin has been designed by the Idaho Department of Water Resources as 
Administrative Basin 34. The terms "Big Lost River Basin" and "Basin 34" are used interchangeably i n  this brief 
Each type of water is discussed below. 
ii. Type P(a)-traditional natural flow water. 
A natural flow water right entitles its holder to the natural availability of water. This is 
different than storage water, which is not naturally available, but artificially stored for later use. For 
example, IDAPA 37.02.03.0 10.07 (the Water Supply Bank Rules) defines "natural flow" as "[wlater 
or the right to use water that exists in a spring, stream, river, or aquifer at a certain time and which 
is not the result of the storage of water flowing at a previous time."j2 On rivers or streams with no 
storage facilities, water that exists at any time at any point in the stream is natural flow water. 
The allocation of natural flow water rights in Idaho is done by prior appropriation. The water 
right with the earlier priority right is entitled to have his or her entire water right filled before any 
junior water right holder is entitled to any water. 
iii. Type 2-storage water. 
Generally speaking, storage water is water that is stored in a reservoir. In Idaho, water rights 
must be obtained to store water in either an on-stream or off-stream facility. These rights are called 
storage water rights. These rights have a priority date, just like natural flow rights. Storage rights 
have "storage" listed as a beneficial use (sometimes referred to as the "purpose of use"). An 
example of such a storage right is attached as Exhibit C to the Affidavit of Bob Shaffer?? which is 
apartial decree for water right no. 34-00012 held by BLRID. Under the purpose and period of  use 
32 IDAPA 37.02.03.010.07. 
33 See Motion to Augrnelit filed by BLRID in this matter, which seeks to add the Affidavit of Bob Shaffer 
and its exhibits, which were inadvertently left out of the record. 
section located on the first page, the purposes listed are "irrigation storage" and "irrigation from 
storage." Natural flow rights do not have storage listed as a beneficial use. 
In an on-stream facility, such as Mackay Reservoir, water that is used to fill a storage right 
is usually stored either during peak flow events (when the inflow exceeds the outflow required to 
satisfy all water rights senior in priority to the storage rights) or during the winter months when 
irrigation natural flow rights are not diverted. 111 other words, when there is more than enough water 
to meet demands downstream, the reservoir may store the excess water. 
It is essential to recognize the ownership ofwater divertedpursuant to BLND's storage water 
held in Mackay Reservoir. BLND's storage rights have a listed point of diversion as the Mackay 
Dam. Once the water has been diverted and impounded by the dam, ownership ofthe stored water 
vests in BLND. As stated by the Idaho Supreme Court: 
After the water was diverted from the natural stream and stored in the reservoir, it 
was no longer "public water" subject to diversion and appropriation under the 
provisions of the Constitution (article 15 5 3). It then became water "appropriated 
for sale, rental or distribution" in accordance with the provisions of Sections 1,2, and 
3, art. 15, of the Constitution. The waters so impounded then became the property 
of the appropriators and owners of the reservoir, impressed with the public trust to 
apply it to a beneficial use. . . 34 
The holder of a storage right is therefore entitled to release of that quantity of water pursuant 
to the terms of the storage right to serve beneficial uses, such as irrigation. To the extent a storage 
water right holder wishes to use a natural river channel, the State of Idaho has granted blanket 
permission for the storage water owner to do so.3S Stored water released from a reservoir may even 
34 Washington County Irr. Dist. v. Talboy, 55 Idaho 382, -, 43 P2d. 943, 945 (1935) 
35 IDAHO CODE $42-105. 
be delivered past the headgates of unfilled senior natural flow rights. Many water users rely on a 
combination of storage and natural flow rights. They use the natural flow when it is available, and 
call on storage as needed. 
iv. Type i(b)-impounded natural flow water ("rotation credit"). 
This type of water is absolutely unique to the Big Lost River Basin, and in fact, some would 
argue that the mechanism employed in recognizing this type of water is contrary to Idaho water law 
and should not be recognized. Nevertheless, IDWR has formally recognized this unique "type" of 
water in the Big Lost River Basin, and permitted it under the administrative rules for the Big Lost 
Basin contained at IDAPA 37.03.12, because it has been historically practiced in the Big Lost River 
Basin for decades. 
This type of water is water that is impounded, or detained, in the Mackay Reservoir at  the 
direction of a holder of a natural flow water right (which does not have storage listed as a beneficial 
use). This is typically done, for exapple, when a natural flow water right holder has swathed kiis or 
her hay and does not need the natural flow water because he or she is waiting for the hay to cure. 
Outside of the Big Lost River Basin, if anatural flow water right holder did not use his or her water, 
the natural flow water is to stay in the river and flow downstream to other junior water users. 
In the Big Lost River Basin, a farmer with his hay down can direct BLRID to impound the 
natural flow water that would have run past the hay farmer's headgate in order to use the water at 
a later date. It is a method of storing water for short periods rather than letting the natural flow water 
flow downstream, but it is not storing water under one of BLRTD's storage water rights. Hence, 
"rotation credit" is defined at IDAPA 37.03.12.010.12 as "[wlater impounded in Macltey Reservoir 
pursuant to a water riglit whose source of water is the Big Lost River and which does not include 
storage as a purpose of use."j6 
Because there are different types of water, at any point in time during the irrigation season, 
water flows in the Big Lost River will include Type l(a)-traditional natural flow water, Type 
I (b)-impounded natural flow water ("rotation credit"), and Type 2-storage water, even though each 
type of water is chemically identical (I-120). For accounting purposes and distribution purposes, the 
rules and practices governing each of these water types are different, and factor into how Rule 
40.03.b is to be understood. 
3. The district court properly interpreted Rule 40.03.b that it unambiguously does 
not provide a mandate to BLRID to use the watermaster's calculation in 
charging its patrons conveyance loss. 
As stated by this Court, "[ilf the statutory language is unambiguous, 'the clearly expressed 
intent of the legislative body must be given effect, and there is no occasion for a court to con~ider 
rules of statutory constr~ction."'~~ A statute is an~biguous "when the meaning is so doubtful or 
obscure that 'reasonable iliinds might be uncertain or disagree as to its meaning.' 'However, 
ambiguity is not established merely because different possible interpretations are presented to a 
court. . . . A statute is not ambiguous merciy because an astute mind can devise more than one 
36 IDAPA 37.03.12.010.12, 
37 Can?, v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 138 Idaho 178, 182, 59 P 3 d  983,987 (2002). 
interpretation of it."38 In determining whether a word or phrase is ambiguous, "[wlords and phrases 
of a statute are to be construed according to their context."39 
Perhaps the most convincing evidence that Rule 40.03.b unambiguously does not bind 
BLRSD is the Title and Scope of Idaho Department of Water Resources Water Distribution 
Rules-Water District 34;' which provide that these rules "shall govern the distributioi~ of surface 
and ground water within Water District 34, the Big Lost River Basin, bv the dulv apvointed 
watermaster . . ."" Watermaster is defined in the rules as "[tlhe duly elected and appointed &@ 
watermaster of Water District 34 who is authorized to perform duties pursuant to Chapters 6 and 8, 
Title 42, Idaho Code, and the decree, or order for interim administration, of water rights for Basin 
34."42 The watermaster is controlled by SDWR, not by an entity such as BLRSD. 
In addition, BLRSD is the only entity that holds storage rights in Basin 34 in Mackay 
Reservoir. Rule 40.03.b is found under the following major heading: 
040. ALLOCATION OF NATURAL FLOW (RULE 40). 
Thus, the rules contained under this major heading specifically address how the state-employed 
watermaster is to distribute and allocate natural flow water rights, and natural flow rights only. 
In addition, it is important to consider the authority pursuant to which IDWR promulgated 
the administrative rules for Basin 34, and the statutory authority governing irrigation districts found 
at Title 43 of the Idaho Code. Chapter 6 of Title 42 of the Idaho Code is entitled "Distribution of 
38 id (citations omitted) (quoting State v. Browning, 123 Idaho 748, 750, 852 P.2d 500, 502 (Ct App. 
1993)). 
39 Huyett v. Idaho State Univ., 140 Idaho 904, 909, 104 P.3d 946, 951 (2004). 
40 IDAPA 37.03.12. 
41 IDAPA 37.03.12.001 (emphasis added). 
42 IDAPA 37.03.12.010.16 (emphasis added). 
Water Among Appropriators." Idaho Code f) 42-603 provides that IDWR is "authorized to adopt 
rules forthe distribution of water from the streams, rivers, lakes, ground water and other natural 
water sources." Further, pursuant to Idaho Code f) 42-604, water districts may be created as "an 
i~istrurnentality of the State of Idaho for the purpose of performing the essential government function 
of distribution of water among appropriators under the laws of the state of Idaho." 
Generally speaking, the watermaster is in charge of ensuring water delivery to various 
locations, but the watermaster's role changes depending upon the type ofwater being delivered. His 
role in distributing natural flow water is defined in Idaho Code $ 42-607: 
It shall be the duty of said watermaster to distribute the waters of the public stream, streams 
or water supply,' comprising a water district, among the several ditches taking water 
therefrom according to the ~ r i o r  i ~ h t s  o f  each respectively, . . . 43 
The highlighted language is key. With different priority water rights, the watermaster is to 
apportion the available natural flow water in the Big Lost River according to priority. 
As to his role with respectto storage water, Idaho Code $42-801 spells out the watermaster's 
responsibjlities. The state of Idaho, pursuant to Idaho Code f)$ 42-105 and 42-801, has granted 
permission to holders of storage water to use natural waterways to deliver water to the canal 
headings of water users 
In the event a natural channel is used for delivery of water by a water user, the watermaster's 
duty as to storage water is "to adjust the headgates of ali ditches not entitled to storage water, and 
in such a manner that those having the right to the use of such water shall secure the volume to 
43 IDAHO CODE 5 42-607 (emphasis added). 
which they are entitled."44 The watermaster delivers storage water to canal headings (points of 
rediversion froin the river) in order for the storage water to reach BLIUD's patrons, but the 
watermaster does so at the storage water owner's direction because the storage water owner owns 
the storage water. It is necessary for the watermaster to distinguish between the different water types 
in the natural channel to ensure that he is delivering natural flow water according to priority. 
As the owner of the storage water, BLIUD then has a legal responsibility to distribute this 
water to its patrons. Given that the Mackay Reservoir is located on the Big Lost River, the most 
practical way of conveying BLRm's stored water is through the Big Lost River, which BLRID does 
because it has permission under Idaho law. 
Title 43 of the Ida110 Code governs irrigation districts. With respect to water distribution, 
an irrigation district board has authority "to establish equitable by-laws, rules and regulations for the 
distribution and use of water among owners of such land, as may be necessary and just to secure the 
just and proper distribution of the same."45 Further, an irrigation district has authority to acquire 
"lands and water rights," which the irrigation district may "hold, use, acquire, manage, occupy and 
possess."46 
Nothing in the plain language of Rule 40.03.b indicates that IDWR, in promulgating rules 
pursuant to Title 42 of the Idaho Code, intended to assert rights to the distribution and management 
of BLRID's storage water and the conveyance loss associated with that storage water, which 
distribution and management BLRID clearly has the authority to do. 
44 IDAHO CODE $ 42-801. 
45 IDAHO CODE 5 43-304. 
46 IDAHO CODE $43-3 16. 
I11 sum, given the title and scope of the rules of which Rule 40.03.b is a part, and the major 
heading entitled "Allocation of Natural Flow," coupled with an understanding of Chapter 6 of Title 
42 governing water distribution and Title 43 governing irrigation districts, the district court was 
correct in finding that Rule 40.03.b does not bind BLRID's method of charging slxink to its patrons, 
which is a matter internal to BLRID. The caIculation contemplated in Rule 40.03.b is necessary for 
the watermaster to deliver natural flow water in certain river reaches, but it is not binding on how 
BLRID charges storage water conveyance loss amongst its patrons. 
In Appellant's Brief, none of these issues relating to interpretation of the rule are addressed 
or discussed. Instead, Appellants male conclusory statements that the language of Rule 40.03.b 
supports their arguments. It appears that Appellants have simply assumed that their reading of Rule 
40.03.b. is controlling, and that in combination with the 1936 decree, the law is clear. This siinply 
ignores what the district court held on this issue of interpretation of Rule 40.03.b. 
4. In the alternative. in the event this court determines that Rule 40.03.b- is 
ambiguous, this court should furthesengage in statutory interpretation and give 
"considerable weight" to PDWR's interpretation of Rule 40.03.b. 
The district court determined that Rule 40.03.b was unambiguous. If this Court determines 
that the rule is ambiguous for any reason, then further analysis is necessary under Idaho law. With 
a finding of ambiguity, the court should engage in statutory construction, and give "considerable 
weight" to the official position from IDWRd7 providing its interpretation of Rule 40.03.b. IDWR's 
position on this matter is set forth in a letter fiom Steve Burrell of IDWR to Richard Reyonds of 
BLRIL3. It is clear that Mr. Burrell's letter stated ID'NR's official position. As noted in the Affidavit 
47 The letter is contained at Exhibit E of the Affidavit of Bob Shaffer. 
of DavidR. Tuthill Jr., which was submitted in conjunction with IDWR 's Response to Cross-Motion 
for Summary Judgment, Mr. Tuthill coilfirmed that the letter from Steve Burrell accurately stated 
the Department's official position on this tnatter." 
The Department's official position is that Rule 40.03.b "does not control BLRID's method 
of assessing its patrons with "shrinkage" for storage rights held by BLRID."49 Further, IDWR's 
position is that "BLRID Board of the Directors and ultimately, BLRID patrons, are responsible for 
determining how the shrink is allocated to each of the patrons. The Water Distribution Rules-Water 
District 34 do not require that BLRID assess its members for shrink on a river reach basis."*' 
In addition, the Department's position as to the practical and logical reading of Rule 40.03.b 
is succinctly and clearly set forth in their Response to Cross-Motionfor Summavy Judgment: 
To determine the amount of water that the watermaster has available to 
deliver to the natural flow water rights in a reach, a calculation of conveyance loss 
attributed to the natural flow water as well as the impounded water being conveyed 
in the river reach must be done. 
Because natural flow and impounded water may flow together in the same 
channel, the amount of convey&ce loss attributable to impounded water must be 
deducted from the total amount of impounded water being conveyed. If impounded 
water does not absorb its proportional share of conveyance loss, the holders of 
natural flow water rights bear the burden of all conveyance losses. If natural flow 
right holders absorb all of the conveyance loss, they may be shorted significant 
quantities of water, especially in reaches where loss rates are upwards of fifty percent 
of the total flow, and impounded water and natural flow water each make up half of 
the total flow. Thus, Rule 40.03.b states that impounded water flowing in the natural 
channel of the river will bear a proportionate share of the conveyance loss together 
with the natural flow water in the river and that the calculation of the loss will be on 
a reach-by-reach basis.51 
48 RVol. 1,p. i31. 
49 Affidavit of Bob Shaffer Affidavit, Exhibit E, at 2 
50 Id. 
51 R Val. I, p. 133-34. 
Once the appropriate amount of conveyance loss is assigned to the impounded water, then the 
watermaster is able to deliver the natural flow water rights in priority. The impounded water was 
already diverted and stored pursuant to the impounded water right's priority dates. Once the 
impounded water is released, it is simply delivered (minus the conveyance loss) to BLRID 
shareholder's diversions. Consideration of all water types is the Big Lost River is necessary. 
As to the amount of conveyance loss by river reach calculated by the watermaster regarding 
impouilded water, IDWR's position is that BLND is not bound by the calculations in how it charges 
its patrons with conveyance loss. 
As a statement of the Department's official position, Mr. Bunell's letter is entitled to 
"considerable weight" in this court's interpretationof Rule 40.03.b. As stated above, this Court has 
articulated a four-prong test for determining the appropriate level of deference to be given to an 
agency construction of a ixle or statute. As set forth below, all four prongs are met. 
The first prong is whether "the agency has bee11 entrusted with the respoilsibility to 
administer the statute at issue." This prong is met because IDWR has been entrusted with the 
responsibility to administer rules and statutes pertaining to distribution of natural flow water. 
The second prong is that "the agency's statutory construction must be reasonable." A 
coilstruction of the rule at issue contained in Mr. Burrell's letter is certainly reasoi?able, especially 
when considering the context of the rule and the title and scope of the rules contained in IDAPA 
37.03.12. 
The third prong is "whether the statutory language at issue does not expressly treat the precise 
questionat issue." Despite the clear language, Appellants are disputing the meaning of Rule 40.03.b, 
and therefore, from their perspective, the language at issue does not expressly treat the question at 
issue. 
The fourth prong is whether "any of the rationales underlying the rule of deference are met." 
These rationales include ( 1 )  a finding of a practical interpretation, (2) presumption of legislative 
acquiescence, (3) agency expertise, (4) repose, and (5) requirement of contemporaneous agency 
interpretati~n.'~ As to this prong, "[wjhen only some of the rationales are present, the court must 
balance the supporting rationales, as all are not weighted equally. If one or more of the rationales 
underlying the rule are present, and no 'cogentreason' exists for denyingthe agency some deference, 
the court should afford 'considerable weight' to tile agency's statutory interpretati~n."'~ 
The fourth prong is likewise met. IDWR's interpretation is practical because it would give 
RLRTD flexibility in management of its affairs consistent with Idaho law. In addition, IDWR has 
expertise in the field of management of Idaho's water resources and, importantly, these rules were 
intended to govern IDWR's employees. Thus, there is no cogent reason for denying the agency some 
deference and the court should afford "considerable weigllt" to IDWR's interpretation of Rule 
40.03.b.54 
In sum, to the extent this court determines that Rule 40.03.b is ambiguous, the court must 
engage in statutory construction, and under the standards discussed above, "considerable weight" 
52 Canty v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 138 Idaho 178, 184, 59 P.3d 983,989 (2002) (quoting Preston v 
Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 131 Idaho 502, 505, 960 P.2d 185, I88 (1998)). 
53 Id. 
54 Mason v. Donnelly Club, 135 Idaho 581, 583,21P.3d 903, 905 (2001) (citations omitted); See also, 
J.R. Simplot Co. v. Tax Comm'n, 120 Idaho 849, 820 P.2d 1206 (1991). 
should have been given to IDWR's interpretation of its rules, which determined that "IDWR does 
not control BLRID's method of assessing its patrons with 'shrinkage'" to BLRID's storage water." 
5.   on elision. 
For the reasons set forth above, Rule 40.03.b is unambiguous, as the district court correctly 
held. In the alternative, if there is an ambiguity, the interpretation of Rule 40.03.b by IDWR is 
entitled to considerable weight, and IDWR's position is consistent with the interpretation ofdistrict 
court 
. Appellants did not have standing to appeal an order relating to resolution of a cross- 
claim they were not a party to, and therefore, to the extent Appellants assert on appeal 
issues relating to the cross-claim, they do not have standing, and their appeal must be 
dismissed. 
It is not entirely clear from Appellant's Brief or the issues submitted on appeal exactly what 
they are asserting on appeal, but to the extent those issues relate to the cross-claim entered into 
between BLND and Intervenors, an appeal of those issues by Appellants must be dismissed because 
they do not have standing. 
The Intervenors and BLRID agreed to a stipulation to resolve Intervenors' cross-claim against 
BLRID. The stipulation was filed in January of 2008, and an "Order, Judgment, and Decree" was 
entered by the coui-t on February 20,2008. The Appellants were not a party to the cross-claim, as 
they were not a coparty to BLRID. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 13(g) provides that "(a] pleading may state as a cross-claim 
any claim by one party against a coparty arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the 
55 Affidavit of Bob Shaffer, Exhibit E ,  at 2. 
subject-matter either of the original action or of a counterclaim therein or relating to any property 
that is the subject-matter of the original a~tion."'~ The Idaho Supreme Court has further noted that 
"[cJross-claims are litigated by parties on the same side of the main litigation, while counterclaims 
are litigated, as here, between the opposing parties to the principal act i~n." '~ 
Simply put, Appellants were not a party to the cross-claim filed against BLRID, and as such, 
Appellants did not have any standing to challenge the stipulation entered into between the parties 
to resolve the cross-claim, nor the district court's order accepting that stipulation and ultimately 
resolving the last remaining issue in the case. 
Appellants nevertheless filed a second motion for reconsideration based on the district couit's 
initial interpretation of Rule 40.03.b, and based their motion on both the initial Rule 40.03.b 
interpretation-which has already been reconsidered once-and on the cross-claim, which Appellants 
were not a party to. The district court did hear oral argument, but ultimately denied the motion for 
recon~ideration.~~ It is not clear from court's order the exact grounds upon which the Appellants' 
second nlotion for reconsideration was denied, but the issue of standing was raised and argued by 
the Intervenors. 
Simply put, a non-party cannot challenge an order in a lawsuit which involves other parties. 
The elected BLRID Board has authority to enter into agreements such as the stipulation, and did so. 
As to the cross-claim, BLRID and Intervenors are now bound pursuant to the stipulation and the 
subsequent district court order. As to Appellants, they lacked standing to challenge the resolution 
56 Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 13(g). 
57 ResourceEngineering, Inc, v. Siler, 94 Idaho 935,939 fn. I, 500 P.2d 836, 840 fn.1 (1972) (quoting 1A 
Barron & Holtzoff, FEDERALPRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 5 397, at 598 (1960)). 
58 RVol. I, p. 201. 
of the cross-claim at the district court level, and therefore, lack standing to appeal issues relating to 
the cross-claim on appeal 
C. Appellants did not properly plead issuer: relating to the 1936 decree, and iherelbre, it 
is not properly raised on appeal. 
In Appeliants' Brief, the Appeilants assert two issues on appeal, both of which primarily 
relate to the interpretation of a 1936 decree. The interpretation and enforcement of the 1936 decree 
was raised for the first time on Appellants' second motion for reconsideration at the district court. 
There is nothing in Appellants' Complaint in this matter seelting interpretation or enforcement of 
this decree. Rather, Appellants' Complaint centered directly on the issue of interpretation and 
application of Rule 40.03.h. 
Perhaps the most telling documents which sets forth how the issue was couched and argued 
by Appellants throughout this litigation is the Second Amended Complaint and Request fov 
Immediate Injunctive Reliep and Appellants first notice of appeal.6o The statement of issues 
contained in the complaint, and the statement of issues on appeal centered on Rule 40.03.b. Nothing ' 
in the either recitation of the issues relate to the 1936 decree. 
In the absence of any such allegations involving the 1936 decree, the Defendants and 
Intervenors were not apprised of any factual issue pertaining to 1936 decree by Plaintiff's complaint. 
Idaho is a "notice pleading" state, and this court is to "look at whether the complaint puts the adverse 
party on notice of the claims brought against it."" Further, in John W Brown Properties v. Blaine 
59 R Vol. i, p. 72-93. 
60 R Vol1, p.187-89. The iirst notice of appeal was withdrawit because there was still a pending cross- 
claiin between BLRID and the Intervenors. 
61 Youngbioodv. Nigbee, I45 Idaho 665,668, 182 P.3d 1199, 1202 (2008). 
C o u n ~ , ' ~  the Idaho Supreme Court stated the applicable standard for reviewing a complaint to 
determine if an issue had been raised: 
The applicable standard against which the sufficiency of Brown's complaint must be 
measured is set out in I.R.C.P. 8(a)(I), which requires only "a short and plain 
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." This standard 
is met by a concise and direci statement fairlv a~prisinq the defendants of the 
claims and the grounds upon which the claims rest.63 
We submit that neither the Intervenors nor other parties were fairly apprised by the Appellants' 
complaint of Appellants' intent lo raise the 1936 decree. There was no reference in the complaint 
to the 1936 decree, or enforcement of any prior decree. Intervenors were thereforenot fairly apprised 
of Appellants' attempt to raise the 1936 decree, and consequently, the issue was not properly plead 
and should not be considered on appeal 
D. In the alternative to Section IEI.C, if this Court does consider the arguments regarding 
the 1936 decree, the 1936 decree retied heavily upon by Appellants does not mandate 
the application of any type of conveyance loss accounting. Further, post-1936 minutes 
of BLRID and other documents establish that BLRID applied a universal conveyancc 
loss allocation, which is contrarydo the assertions made by Appellants. 
Appellants contend at length in their Appellant's Brief that the I936 decree contained at 
Exhibit A of the Affidavit of Patrick D. fixed the apportionment of benefits for each water 
user, and further argue that this included a fixed amount of conveyance loss built into that allocatio~l 
for specific parcels ofproperty. Because of this fixed apportionment, Appellants argue, BLRID does 
not have discretion or the ability to allocate conveyance loss. In the interest of thoroughness, we feel 
62 I29 Idaho 740, 744,932 P.2d 368, 372 (Ct. App. 1997) 
63 Id. (emphasis added). 
64 R Vol. 11, p. 29-68. 
it necessary to respond to this new argument. To the extent this Court determines that this new 
argument should be considered, we offer the following brief rebuttal. 
First, glaringly absent from the 1936 decree is any mention of the term "shrink or 
"conveyance loss," or any discussion of this issue, yet Appellants contend that this decree "fixed" 
how conveyance loss was to be allocated to all patrons of BLIUD. The dec1:ee simply did not address 
this issue, and given the absence of any language addressing it, this means that the allocation of 
conveyance loss was left in the discretion of BLRID. At best, Appellants' argument is based only 
their hoped-for interpretation of the decree, and not based on the analysis of its plain language, or 
acknowledgment of BLND history on this issue. 
Second, Appellants rely upon a chart found in the decree showing how storage water was to 
be allocated each year in relation to the priority date of natural flow rights. BLRID allocated more 
storage water to water right holders with later priority natural flow rights, as they had previously 
decided.65 But it is crucial to note that this did not list individual property descriptions, and 
therefore, did not decree or adjudicate that amount to a specific piece of property. 
Indeed, it is critical to note that the holders of these water rights were located in various areas 
in the Big Lost River Valley, which meant that some early priority water right holders were located 
near the reservoir, while others were not. In other words, there was and is today a veritable 
patchwork of priority dates tlu.oughout the entire valley. 
65 See Exhibit B attached to Affidavit of Attorney Robert L. Harris, which is a copy of the distribution 
plan of BLRID in 1935. 
The actual meaning of the chart relied upon by Appellants is made clear by examining 
subsequent action by BLRID, and it shows that conveyance loss was allocated universally previous 
to its distribution. Attached as Exhibit A to the Affidavit of Attorney Robert L. Harris66 is a copy 
the official minutes of BLRID from May 14, 1937, just over one year after the 1936 decree was 
entered. The millutes show a table wherein the Board calculated how to allocate the water in 
Mackay Reservoir at the time, which was only 65% full. As the Court can see from the chart, which 
is labeled "CHART SHOWING PRO-RATED DISTRIBUTION OF STORAGE WATER W 
MACKAY RESERVOIR MAY 1, 1937," BLRID allocated its storage water based on three items, 
which are discussed below 
First, the amount of storage water that was to go to each patron of BLRID depended on 
priority date of natural flow water rights held by patrons of the district. BLRID allocated more 
storage water to water right holders with later priority natural flow rights, as they had previously 
de~ided.~ '  As shown on the chart attached to the May 14, 1937 minutes, the chart took the natural 
flow priority date into consideration in its allocatio~l of storage water. 
The second consideration was the percentage that Mackay Reservoir filled. In 1937, it filled 
65%, which meant that BLRID was to allocate the 65% fill to BLRID's patrons. The Court can see 
how this was considered by BLRID in examining the chart 
The third, and perhaps most important consideration, was the "60 % amount included in the 
formulas. The 60% amount of water delivered meant that BLFUD allocated a 40% shrink factor and 
66 R Val. 11, p. 176-82. 
67 See Exhibit B attached to Affidavit of Attorney Robert L. Ilanis, R Vol. 11, p.185, which is a copy of 
the distribution plan of BLlUD in 1935. This chart illustrates graphically the scale as to how RI,RID would allocate 
storage as it related to natural flow. 
did so while the storage water was in the reservoir. The amounts thereafter calculated by BLRID 
were the amouiits delivered to water users' individual canal headings, and such amounts had already 
been "pre-shrunk"-in other words, everyone bore a 40% shrink for the storage water. The 60% 
amount, multiplied by the 65% (fill of the reservoir) multiplied by the approved acres equaled the 
"amount delivered at point of diversion in acre feet," which meant that this was the amount to be 
delivered to each water user's canal heading after a conveyance loss factor had been taken into 
consideration. 
These documents demonstrate how the chart relied upon by Appellants really was used. 
Further, they also demonstrate that BLRID and its patrons interpreted the 1936 decree in a manuer 
that the chart did not have a built-in shrink allocation, that could not be changed by BLRID. As 
show in the 1937 minutes, the Board inserted the 40% percentage-the shrink allocation-based on 
their discretion under Idaho law. If Appellant's allege that B1,RID's actions are illegal today, then 
certainly Appellants will have to explain why BLRTD's procedures for over seventy (70) years were 
never challenged. It seems clear that Appellants are reading in an interpretation that suits their 
needs, but this interpretation is not a fair reading of the plain language of the decree, and ignores 
BLRID action from the very next year. 
In addition to the 1937 minutes, attached at Exhibit C to the Harris Affidavit are minutes 
from BLRID meeting held on March 14, 1994. At this meeting, Chairman Terry V. Monson of 
BLRID reported on the storage allocation, and the first page of minutes record the following 
summary of Mr. Monson's statement: 
Chairinan Monson explained the water at the old level of the reservoir at 38,405 AF 
and how the new level brought this up to additional on the cards of 107%. That there 
is a built in factor for shrink. That the reservoir was full at 6066.12 to 43,85 1 AF 
but there is 400 AF of undeliverable storage, leaving 43,451 for allocation. That 
when its allocated, this allocation of based on what was put on the cards. What is on 
the cards is the amount less the built in shrink. This is how the system has 
worked for 58 years now.68 
The allocation ofconveyance loss amounts to storage water was historically done universally, 
as noted by Chairman Monson, and not by river reach, as Appellants have argued. 
In sum, BLRID obviously did not view the 1936 decree as a requirement to assess 
conveyance loss by river reach, as they did not operate that way for many decades, as shown by the 
above minutes. BLRID did not interpret the 1936 decree as a decree that fixed how conveyance loss 
was to be allocated. This evidences the general consensus interpretation of the 1936 decree. For 
Appellants to now suggest a different interpretation is an argument that is wholly without merit. 
E. Intervenors are entitled to attorney's fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code 3 12-121. 
Generally, it appears that Appellants have only reasserted arguments to this Court that they 
made on their second motion for reconsideratjon to the district court. Under Idaho Code 5 12-121, 
"the judge may award reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party or parties, provided that this 
section shall not alter, repeal or amend any statute which otherwise provides for the award of 
attorney's fees."69 Additionally, "[alttorney fees can be awarded on appeal under [I.C. 3 12-1.21 ] 
only if the appeal was brought or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without fo~ndation."~~ 
In the recent case of Teton Peaks Inv. Co., LLC v. Ohme, this Court awarded attorney's fees 
against the appellant because "Teton Peaks has simply asked this Court to second guess the district 
68 R Vol. 11, p.187 (emphasis added). 
69 Teton Peaks Inv. Co., LLCv Ohnze, 195 P.3d 1207, 1212 (2008) 
70 id. (modification in original). 
court . . .""' Similarly, the Appellants in this matter have only asked this Court to second guess the 
district court, and in doing so, have pursued the appeal unreasonably and without foundation. 
Further, they have attempted to inject new issues not properly plead. Intervenors request that this 
Court award attorney's fees to Interveilors for defending this appeal. 
71 Id. 
nv. cowcLusaePN. 
For the reasons set forth above, Rule 40.03.b should be interpreted in amanner explained by 
Intervenors above, which is consistent with IDWR's interpretation, and which was ordered by the 
district court. With regards to the issue of the effect of the 1936 decree, the issue was not properly 
plead. In the event this Court considers the 1936 decree on this appeal, it does not mandate to 
BLRID how to charge conveyance loss amongst its patrons. 
Respectfully submitted this 20th day of February, 2009 
Robert L. Harris , Esq. d; 
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